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Gig Workers and Financial Security

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Abstract

The gig economy has experienced remarkable growth over the past decade, transforming the traditional labor market and redefining employment structures worldwide. Gig work, characterized by short-term, task-based, and often digitally mediated jobs, offers flexibility and autonomy but also introduces significant financial vulnerabilities for workers. This chapter critically examines the financial security of gig workers, exploring income stability, access to social protection, retirement benefits, and healthcare provisions within the context of the evolving labor landscape. Drawing upon international studies and case examples, the chapter highlights disparities in financial outcomes between gig workers and traditional employees. Key concerns include income unpredictability, lack of employer-sponsored benefits, limited access to formal credit systems, and challenges in long-term financial planning. The chapter discusses how factors such as platform policies, national labor regulations, and worker bargaining power affect financial resilience. Special attention is given to how financial insecurity disproportionately impacts marginalized groups, including women, youth, and migrant workers engaged in the gig economy. Moreover, the chapter assesses policy interventions and social innovations aimed at enhancing financial security for gig workers, such as portable benefits schemes, inclusive social security models, and fintech solutions for income smoothing and savings. Drawing on global practices, the chapter concludes by advocating for a multi-stakeholder approach involving governments, platform companies, labor unions, and financial institutions to safeguard the economic well-being of gig workers in the digital age.

Keywords: *Gig Economy, Financial Security, Income Volatility, Social Protection, Labor Policy.*

Introduction

Gig Workers and Financial Security

The gig economy – labor markets characterized by short-term, task-based contracts often mediated by digital platforms – has grown rapidly worldwide. By some estimates, up to 12% of the global workforce now engages in some form of gig work (Tan *et al.*, 2021). In India, this trend is pronounced: roughly 7.7 million workers were estimated to be engaged in the platform-based gig economy in 2020–21 (about 1.5% of the workforce), projected to reach 23.5 million ($\approx 4.1\%$ of the workforce) by 2029–30. Gig work spans delivery services, ride-hailing, e-commerce and retail tasks, and freelance digital labor. It offers workers flexibility and autonomy, enabling them to choose their hours and tasks. However, it also introduces financial precarity. Unlike traditional employees, most gig workers lack formal contracts, guaranteed wages, and employer-sponsored benefits, leaving them vulnerable to income volatility and lacking a social safety net (Nindwani, 2024). This chapter examines gig workers' financial security, focusing on income stability, access to benefits, credit, and long-term planning. We highlight how platform policies, labor regulations, and worker characteristics shape outcomes, with special attention to India's experience and comparisons with global contexts (Lehdonvirta *et al.*, 2019). Key challenges include unpredictable earnings, scant savings, and exclusion from social insurance programs. We also review emerging solutions – portable benefits schemes, fintech innovations (like on-demand pay and digital credit), and policy interventions – that aim to bolster gig workers' financial resilience. Throughout, we consider how gig work often exacerbates vulnerabilities among women, youth, and migrant workers, and we argue that multi-stakeholder actions (from governments, platforms, unions, and financial institutions) are needed to safeguard gig workers' economic well-being.

Conceptualizing the Gig Economy

"Gig workers" are generally defined as individuals engaged outside traditional employer–employee relationships, doing short-term, task-based jobs for pay (Jabagi *et al.*, 2019). They can be classified into two broad categories: platform workers (who find work via digital apps or websites, e.g. ride-hailing or delivery drivers, online freelancers) and non-platform gig workers (those in casual or contract roles outside organized labor structures, such as short-term retail or factory work). Both categories share features of flexibility, on-demand work, and the absence of guaranteed hours or benefits (Katsabian & Davidov, 2023). For example, India's Social Security Code (2020) defines gig and platform work as any work arranged outside traditional employment through a digital platform.

The composition of India's gig workforce is instructive. While "gig economy" often evokes images of ride-share drivers, sectoral data reveal a wider spread of work (Josserand & Kaine, 2019). Surveys show that, in India's gig workforce (~ 77 lakh in

2020–21), about 35% were in retail trade and sales, 32% in e-commerce platforms, 17% in transportation, and smaller shares in manufacturing and finance/insurance.



Figure 1: Distribution of gig economy workers in India by sector (circa 2020). The largest segments are in retail trade (27 lakh) and e-commerce platforms (25 lakh)

Gig workers also show distinct demographic profiles. Across cities in India, delivery drivers (a large subset of gig workers) are overwhelmingly young and male (Ray, 2024). A recent study of urban delivery-platform drivers found an average age of 28, with less than 1% female representation. Women's participation in app-based driving and delivery is extremely low (often cited around 1–2% in India's food and transport platforms). By contrast, many gig workers are migrants: roughly half of surveyed delivery drivers migrated from other states. Many are also students or supplementary earners; in one survey 32% of drivers reported simultaneously being enrolled in school (Shults *et al.*, 2016). Overall, gig workers tend to be younger and lower-skilled than the general workforce, often turning to platform work out of economic necessity. In India, over half of surveyed gig drivers said they joined to meet household needs, and only a minority (about 6%) cited flexibility as the primary lure (Hussain, 2023). This suggests many have few alternatives for stable jobs. Similarly, global surveys by the World Bank indicate that online gig work is especially appealing to youth and women in developing countries, where formal jobs may be scarce (Graham *et al.*, 2017).

Gig arrangements are also heterogeneous. Many platform workers combine multiple income streams: a typical driver might switch between ride-hailing, food delivery, and e-commerce delivery apps depending on demand (Almunawar & Anshari, 2020). One study found gig workers on average had 1.69 distinct income sources, often using platform work as a supplement rather than sole livelihood. Hours worked also vary widely: although media portrayals emphasize long shifts, surveys indicate many drivers work part-time (Boden *et al.*, 2008). In one Indian study, only

23% of delivery drivers worked over 8 hours per day on the platform, with the rest treating it as intermittent or supplemental work. This reflects the gig economy's appeal to those who need extra income around other commitments (like students or second-job holders), but also underscores the irregularity of gig engagement (Gautama & Sari, 2025).

In sum, the gig economy in India (and globally) comprises a diverse workforce engaging in non-standard employment (Loganathan, 2022). It is growing rapidly – India's gig workforce grew ~30% in four years from 2020 to 2024 – driven by digitalization and changing work preferences. At the same time, its characteristics (non-fixed hours, multi-platform work, lack of formal contracts) raise questions about income stability and protections for these workers. As one policy brief notes, gig workers are “highly fragmented and situated at the bottom of the wage ladder”, requiring careful analysis of their economic security. Table 1 summarizes some key metrics on India's gig workers drawn from recent surveys and data (Behl *et al.*, 2022).

Table 1: Key Characteristics of Gig Workers in India (Selected Data)

Characteristic	Value	Source
Gig workforce size (2020–21)	7.7 million (platform-based gig workers)	NITI Aayog
Projected gig workforce (2029–30)	23.5 million	NITI Aayog
Average age (delivery drivers)	28 years	IDinsight
Gender composition (drivers)	~99% male ($\leq 1\%$ female)	IDinsight
Migrant workers (drivers)	~50% of drivers	IDinsight
Full-time gross monthly earnings	₹27,814 (~US\$332)	IDinsight
Full-time net monthly earnings	₹18,761 (~US\$222) after 32% expenses	IDinsight
Hours worked (full-time drivers)	62 hours/week on average	IDinsight
No savings (all gig workers, India)	65% of respondents	LEAD Krea survey
No insurance coverage (all gig workers)	~50% of respondents (no health/life insurance)	LEAD Krea survey
Under ₹2.5L/year earnings	77.6% of gig workers	TeamLease data
Under ₹5L/year earnings	97.6% of gig workers	TeamLease data

These figures highlight two patterns. First, India's gig workforce is large and growing (projected to roughly triple by 2030), comprising mostly young, often migrating men. Second, most earn modest incomes. Nearly 98% of Indian gig workers earn below ₹5 lakh annually, and over 77% earn under ₹2.5 lakh—roughly on par with starting salaries in other entry-level sectors. The next sections will examine what such volatility and lack of coverage mean for gig workers' financial security (Celestin & Vanitha, 2021).

Financial Challenges Faced by Gig Workers

Gig work provides income, but often in a volatile, unpredictable manner. Unlike salaried employees, gig workers are paid *per task or per hour*, with no guaranteed minimum wage or steady paycheck (Friedman, 2014). Their daily earnings can fluctuate widely depending on demand, platform incentives, and time invested. For instance, during off-peak periods or slow demand, a delivery driver may complete few orders and earn far less than on a busy day (Mousavi *et al.*, 2020). In downturns or lockdowns (as seen in 2020–21), platforms may scale back orders, leaving workers with no base pay. As one policy study notes, “gig workers are paid based on tasks completed or hours worked (Davies, 2020). This results in significant income variability, leaving many without stable financial footing”.

Surveys underscore this instability. One study found **85% of gig workers work 8+ hours/day** to earn a living, yet their monthly earnings remain low; only 21% work beyond 12 hours (meaning most cannot simply “work more” to earn substantially more income). In practical terms, full-time gig drivers in India average around ₹18,761 per month net. Considering the hours worked (≈62 per week), this corresponds to roughly ₹75 per hour – barely above minimum-wage levels. Drivers themselves report that despite long hours, their take-home pay often just meets subsistence needs (Togonu-Bickersteth, 1989). Many gig workers therefore continue to juggle multiple jobs or return to formal work: a majority of former platform drivers surveyed had re-entered full-time employment after leaving the platform (Clyde *et al.*, 2024).

This **low wage premium and cost pressure** characterizes gig work. Platform algorithms often reduce fares or commissions over time to cut costs. For example, one union leader noted that the per-delivery commission on some apps fell from ~₹35 to ₹10–15 in recent years, drastically reducing gig incomes even as workers had to cover more distance per order. Meanwhile, gig platforms may deduct fees, surge pricing algorithms may be opaque, and workers bear their own vehicle and fuel costs (which can eat a third of gross earnings). Many drivers report “*unexplained deductions*” in app payouts, leaving them uncertain of their net take-home pay. Such unpredictability makes personal budgeting and planning very difficult (Chattoe & Gilbert, 1999).

Uncertainty extends to future prospects. Gig work is often **short-term or project-based**. The average tenure on one platform was only 13 months (Cropanzano *et al.*, 2023). Workers may find it hard to rely on gig income long-term if platforms restrict work, change terms, or if a worker’s skills or circumstances change (Friedman, 2014). For example, drivers who left one platform often went to find new full-time jobs that paid better (nearly 50% of surveyed drivers returned to formal work). These findings suggest gig platforms can serve as temporary stepping stones but rarely as stable career destinations (Lam & Triandafyllidou, 2021).

Furthermore, gig workers typically lack **savings buffers**. In a survey of Indian gig workers, 65% reported having **no personal savings** (Celestin & Vanitha, 2021). Without savings, even short-term income dips can cause severe hardship. Nearly half ($\approx 50\%$) of workers also had **no access to any insurance** (health, life, or accident). Thus, a medical emergency, accident, or period of illness can quickly lead to financial ruin (Cook *et al.*, 2010). Indeed, policy analysts note that gig workers' financial safety nets are virtually non-existent: without employer-sponsored provident funds or health schemes, these workers "have no social safety net". The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated this vulnerability: many gig workers lost earnings for weeks or months with no unemployment support, and some reported turning to high-interest debt or charity to survive (Ray, 2024).

Another dimension of financial precarity is limited **income growth or advancement**. Unlike many salaried jobs with periodic raises or career progression, gig work often has a flat pay structure (Friedman, 2014). Workers may rely on additional hours or faster completion of tasks to earn more, but once those options are maxed out, earnings stagnate. This dynamic can be seen in the TeamLease data: virtually none of the workforce exceeded ₹5 lakh annual income, and only a few percent earned between ₹5–7.5 lakh. Those in higher-skilled gig sectors (like digital marketing) can earn more (₹30,000–₹100,000 per month for experienced freelancers), but such opportunities require specific skills or networks. The majority in transport/delivery remain in a low-earning plateau.

In summary, gig workers in India face **significant financial risks** due to highly variable pay, extensive work hours, and lack of growth prospects. Their incomes are often comparable to those of informal or low-skill full-time jobs, but without the stability and benefits of formal employment (Zwart & Baker, 2018). As one analysis cautions, "without robust policies addressing wage regulation and social protection, gig work will remain a precarious form of employment". Addressing these vulnerabilities is essential for improving gig workers' financial security (Ng *et al.*, 2024).

Gig Work and Social Protection Gaps

A central issue for gig workers is the **absence of social protection** that typically comes with formal employment. In India, social security (such as healthcare, pensions, and workplace safety nets) has historically been tied to formal jobs with an employer. For example, salaried employees may contribute to the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) and Employees' State Insurance (ESI), gaining retirement savings, health insurance, and disability benefits. Gig workers—classified as independent contractors—do not qualify for these schemes under existing rules (Stewart & Stanford, 2017). Consequently, **none of their income is set aside for future benefits**. As a result, even routine medical bills or work-related injuries must be paid out-of-pocket.

This gap is widespread. Surveys indicate about half of gig workers in India have *no* health or life insurance (Ghorpade *et al.*, 2024). Many lack accident or disability cover, despite high on-road risks; a WHO report notes that delivery and ride drivers face significant injury hazards, with no clear compensation mechanisms available. Pension savings are similarly absent: even long-serving gig workers typically must rely on their current earnings for retirement, with no mandatory pension plan contributions (Mees & Smith, 2019). Analysts point out that this “lack of coverage is particularly detrimental for workers who have irregular access to healthcare or who work in hazardous conditions”.

The legal framework is only beginning to address these gaps. India’s **Code on Social Security (2020)** marked the first time gig and platform workers were explicitly defined in law (Choudhary & Shireshi, 2022). It empowers the government to create a national social security fund for gig workers and frames schemes for them. However, the Code does **not automatically grant full rights**. Rules still need to be drafted, and many labor protections applicable to traditional employees (like minimum wage or paid leave) are not explicitly extended to gig workers (Stewart & Stanford, 2017). Critics note that the Code’s definition alone “fails to provide a clear legal framework” for inclusion in benefits, leaving workers in a legal gray area. In practice, platforms are not considered employers, so they are not obliged to contribute to workers’ benefits. As one analysis observes, “companies can avoid contributing to social security schemes on behalf of [gig workers], leaving millions without access to even the most basic benefits like health insurance or retirement pensions”.

At the state level, a few initiatives have tried to fill the void. For example, the newly enacted *Rajasthan Platform-Based Gig Workers Act (2023)* establishes a welfare board and fund for gig workers, financed in part by a levy on platform revenues (Ray & John, 2025). Karnataka has run a “Gig Workers Insurance Scheme” covering accidental death, disability and hospitalization for registered gig workers. These programs provide limited coverage (e.g. ₹4 lakh accidental death benefit in Karnataka) but do not address income loss or pension. Their **scope and scale are currently small**, and many workers remain outside their ambit (Loveman & Sengenberger, 1991).

The 2025 Union Budget made a notable stride: it **expanded India’s flagship health insurance (PM-JAY)** to cover gig and informal workers. By allowing gig workers to register via the e-Shram portal (a national database for unorganized workers), they became eligible for up to ₹5 lakh per family in healthcare coverage. About **10 million gig workers** were estimated to benefit from this move. This step acknowledges the need for healthcare safety nets, but it is a stop-gap rather than a comprehensive solution (Hawkins *et al.*, 2017). Critics of the budget note that even

these measures don't ensure *regularized* income or future financial security; underlying issues of wage regulation and social insurance remain unaddressed.

Globally, many gig workers face similar social protection gaps. The World Bank has noted that across low-income countries, most gig workers “work outside the purview of labor regulations and lack access to social insurance and benefits”. ILO studies report that platform workers rarely receive paid sick leave, unemployment insurance, or employer-funded retirement plans unless explicitly reclassified as employees (Yaroshenko *et al.*, 2024). In effect, gig work often reverts to informal-status working conditions, where any risk (illness, accident, old age) must be borne individually.

Given these shortcomings, advocates are exploring new models. Ideas under consideration include **portable benefits** accounts (where multiple platforms and even governments contribute to a centralized benefits pool for each worker) and **universal social schemes** that cover all workers regardless of contract type. For instance, the Brookings Institution discusses *portable benefits* schemes (common in US policy debates) that decouple benefits from a single employer, effectively attaching them to the individual worker. In India, policy recommendations have called for creating dedicated welfare funds financed by a mix of government and platform contributions (Mukhopadhyay *et al.*, 2019). The emerging consensus is that extending social protection to gig workers will require both legal reform and innovative financing – shifting from employer-centric schemes to those tailored for a mobile, multi-employer workforce.

Access to Financial Services and Credit

Another pillar of financial security is access to formal financial services – banking, credit, insurance, and savings instruments. Many gig workers, however, remain **underserved by traditional finance**. Because gig incomes are irregular and unverified by formal employers, banks and NBFCs often regard gig workers as high-risk borrowers. As a result, a large share of gig workers have limited credit histories and struggle to obtain loans, mortgages or even credit cards (Buchak, 2024). Without formal contracts or steady pay slips, they find it hard to satisfy lenders' documentation requirements.

This credit gap has practical consequences. For instance, owning or renting a vehicle is often essential for an app-based driver (Peer *et al.*, 2020). Yet financing a bike or car purchase typically requires a loan. Gig workers may be ineligible for standard auto loans (which rely on proof of steady employment) and thus resort to higher-interest financing or forego the asset. Similarly, absence of collateral or credit records means many cannot take advantage of productive loans for upskilling or entrepreneurship (Jrad, 2023).

Recognizing this challenge, policymakers and companies are experimenting with tailored financial products. India's policy brief on the gig economy explicitly recommends **fintech and cash-flow lending** for gig workers. For example, a fintech firm might offer micro-loans based on app data (delivery volumes, ratings) rather than credit history. Likewise, some platforms have started partnerships with finance companies to extend credit specifically to their gig workforce. The goal is to build a "financial passport" for gig workers, enabling them to save securely and borrow affordably.

Indeed, India's growing "digital ID" infrastructure (Aadhaar, digital payments, and credit registries) provides opportunities. Many gig workers already use mobile wallets and UPI (Unified Payments Interface) for transactions, which generates digital footprints of their income. Fintech firms can leverage this data for alternative credit scoring. New initiatives like the *Grameen Credit Score* (introduced in the 2025 budget) and expanded banking through India Post Payment Bank are aimed at widening financial inclusion. These can benefit gig workers by simplifying KYC processes and offering micro-savings accounts (Baker, 2025).

Early fintech solutions have emerged. Some startups (e.g. KarmaLife in India) offer **Earned Wage Access (EWA)**, letting gig workers withdraw a portion of earned wages on demand before payday, easing cashflow crunches. Others provide instant micro-insurance or pay-per-day coverage via digital platforms. By smoothing incomes or providing safety nets, such tools can mitigate temporary shocks (Alderman & Haque, 2006). However, these services are still nascent and limited. Without broad regulatory support or subsidy, many gig workers may remain hesitant to adopt them.

On the other hand, digital finance also introduces risks. Some gig workers may take on short-term debt to cover a bad week, risking debt cycles. Without strong financial literacy support, access to credit could lead to over-indebtedness. Therefore, expanding financial services for gig workers must be paired with education and consumer protection (Samsudin *et al.*, 2024). Ensuring transparency in fintech offerings (just as with platform algorithms) is crucial.

In sum, **financial inclusion** – access to banking and credit – is essential for gig workers' stability, yet remains inadequate. India's policy recommendations emphasize designing credit products specifically for platform workers (e.g. unsecured priority sector loans for first-time borrowers). As digitization advances, there is potential to connect gig workers to formal financial services, but significant work remains to tailor these services and educate the workforce. (Graham *et al.*, 2017)

Policy and Regulatory Perspectives

Governments are grappling with how to regulate the gig economy. Key policy questions include worker classification, benefit entitlements, and platform responsibilities. India has taken several steps: the 2020 Social Security Code legally

recognized gig and platform workers and authorized the government to develop schemes for them. In practice, however, enforcement lags behind policy intentions. There is no standardized mechanism ensuring platforms contribute to welfare funds; instead, state governments and platforms have experimented with piecemeal arrangements (Ansell & Gash, 2018).

At the national level, India's approach has been one of **self-regulation and voluntarism**. For example, most gig platforms currently operate under their own Codes of Conduct, committing to provide limited insurance and welfare (e.g. Swiggy and Zomato now offer some accident and hospitalization cover to delivery partners). These are corporate initiatives, not mandated by law. The government's main role so far has been to create inclusive policies: through the e-Shram portal, gig workers can register with the state, opening the door to existing welfare schemes like health insurance. The 2025 budget significantly pushed this: it made e-Shram registration free and expanded eligibility of PM-JAY to gig workers, effectively extending health coverage to millions of gig and informal workers. This is a major step recognizing gig workers as deserving of formal social security.

Nonetheless, many policy gaps remain. Critics note that existing labor and social security laws are not fully adapted for multi-employer, part-time work (Arup, 2022). For instance, it is unclear how the law will apportion responsibilities when a worker serves multiple platforms simultaneously. The Draft Karnataka Gig Workers Bill (2024) attempted to answer this by requiring **aggregators** (platform companies) to register workers and contribute to a welfare fund. Under the draft bill, each gig worker would have to register with the state board, and platforms would pay a welfare fee (e.g. 1–2% of a gig worker's monthly remuneration) into a fund. This model echoes proposals in other places (like the Washington State attempt to create portable benefits funds). The Karnataka draft also mandates grievance redressal, termination rules, and an official definition of gig work.

Comparatively, other jurisdictions have taken varied approaches. In California (USA), Assembly Bill 5 initially classified most gig workers as employees, entitling them to minimum wage and benefits – though this was partially undone by a referendum (Prop 22) allowing ride-share platforms to treat drivers as contractors under specific conditions. The EU has recently moved toward reclassifying some platform workers as employees and guaranteeing certain rights. Globally, many policymakers are considering *new categories* between “employee” and “contractor” to extend some protections (e.g. proposed Spanish and Italian laws on “dependent contractors”). These efforts reflect a recognition that gig work is eroding traditional employer responsibilities (Friedman, 2014). India's Social Security Code allows the central and state governments to specify which schemes apply to gig workers, and to finance them through platform

levies. However, concrete rules (e.g. mandatory contributions or minimum wages) have not yet been uniformly enacted at the national level.

Labor unions and worker groups have begun to organize gig workers' voices. For example, India's Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers has lobbied for assured minimum earnings per order and clarity on how fares are computed, citing widespread discontent over arbitrary commission changes. Such groups also press for legislation: the draft bills in Karnataka and Rajasthan were influenced by advocacy from worker organizations (Agarwala, 2019). Their involvement signals a shift from gig workers being atomized toward collective bargaining – a key factor in financial security, as seen in other sectors.

In summary, policy responses in India have been **fragmented and evolving** (Rai, 2017). On one hand, the government recognizes the scale of the gig economy and has begun to adapt frameworks (e.g. extending social schemes, drafting state bills). On the other hand, enforcement and compliance are uneven. Recommendations frequently call for a **multi-stakeholder approach**: involving platforms, workers, financial institutions and regulators to co-create solutions. For instance, experts suggest governments set up “portable” social security accounts funded by platform levies, while platforms ensure transparency in pay and allow worker contributions to retirement schemes. The challenge is to balance protecting workers with preserving the flexibility and innovation that gig platforms bring. As one analyst put it, the success of policies will depend on “swift and effective implementation” to truly impact gig workers' lives.

Global Case Studies and Comparative Perspectives

Although this chapter focuses on India, lessons from abroad are instructive. Internationally, gig work has raised similar concerns over financial vulnerability. A recent World Bank report (“Working Without Borders: The Promise and Peril of Online Gig Work”) highlights that in developing economies, gig platforms are growing fast and can offer opportunities to women and youth, but lack of social protections remains a serious issue. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa saw a 130% rise in job postings on digital platforms, and 60% of firms in low-income countries report using gig workers, yet “most people [there] work outside the purview of labor regulations”. The report cautions that while gig work could support livelihoods, wage gaps and missing benefits threaten equity (Chittoor & Aulakh, 2015).

Several countries are pioneering approaches to improve gig workers' economic security. In the United States, **portable benefits** is a hot topic. Though no federal policy yet exists, states like Washington have considered “Benefits Not Bonuses” legislation to require platforms to pay into benefits accounts for each worker. A Brookings roundtable report explains that a portable benefits model would allow gig workers to *carry* retirement, health, or childcare benefits as they move

between jobs. The key is pooling contributions at the individual level. Such models are being tested by companies like Lyft (in a limited way) and by nonprofits (e.g. Freelancers Union in the US). The Brookings analysis emphasizes that portable benefits alone don't guarantee wages; rather, they aim to fill the gaps in *traditional* employment-based benefits.

In Europe, the **EU Platform Work Directive (2021)**, recently approved, mandates greater transparency on pay algorithms, clearer criteria for employment status, and rights to collective bargaining for some app-based workers. It requires platforms to provide information on pay and algorithmic management and to respect certain minimum rights (e.g. vacation days, sickness pay) if workers are classified as employees. This shift signals an EU-wide intent to align platform work with standard labor protections. India's current laws do not yet specify such requirements, but the idea of requiring platforms to share information and uphold safety standards is gaining traction in policy discussions.

In Asia, neighboring countries have experimented with their own schemes. Indonesia's law on gig workers obliges platforms to provide occupational accident insurance. Bangladesh reportedly plans to create a registration authority for gig platforms. While not a systematic solution, these efforts show global recognition of the problem. Each context differs – tax revenues, social systems, and labor histories vary – but common elements emerge: (1) Gig workers often need **tailored social insurance** (e.g. group sickness/pension schemes), (2) Platforms may need to contribute financially in new ways, and (3) Governments must update legal definitions of work.

Another comparative perspective is seen in **grassroots organizing**. In many countries, gig worker unions are pushing for benefits. For instance, in the US, the Independent Drivers Guild secured some liability insurance from Uber, and in India, the TGPWU founder lobbied for consistent commission structures. This mirrors the early industrial labor movement: collective action becomes a way to negotiate with powerful gig corporations. If sustained, such movements could improve information and bargaining power (a form of “informal bargaining power” in regulatory terms).

While India's journey is unique, it reflects a global trend: the nature of work is changing, and social protection systems must adapt. For example, the World Bank report suggests exploring “new social insurance” models and collective bargaining frameworks in developing countries. Lessons from abroad indicate that **no one-size-fits-all** solution exists. Instead, hybrid approaches – blending direct government programs, employer mandates, and innovative platforms – are needed. This chapter draws on such global experiences to identify best practices (like using digital IDs for inclusion, or trialing portable account models) that could inform India's policies.

Financial Technologies and Innovations

Technology itself can be part of the solution. Fintech companies are beginning to **address gig workers' financial needs** directly. One promising area is **Earned Wage Access (EWA)**: apps that let workers receive part of their earned income immediately rather than waiting for payday. In India, startups like KarmaLife and Wagely partner with employers or platforms to advance earned wages. For a gig worker struggling to pay rent during a slow week, EWA can provide crucial liquidity, preventing high-interest debt or defaults. Early studies (from garment factories) suggest that access to on-demand wages can reduce financial stress and may increase worker productivity, though it doesn't replace the need for long-term benefits.

Another innovation is in **micro-insurance and savings tools**. Some platforms offer workers low-cost insurance add-ons; for example, a small daily premium can cover accident or hospitalization risk. Digital platforms also enable automatic micro-savings: an app could round up a gig's fee to the nearest rupee and deposit the change into a savings fund. Such "set-and-forget" savings could help build emergency buffers over time. With the ubiquity of smartphones among gig workers, these digital nudges and products can be scalable. However, uptake depends on financial literacy and trust, so education campaigns alongside product launches are important.

Peer-to-peer financial support is also emerging. In some communities, gig workers pool resources for health or vehicle repairs. Cooperative societies for drivers can facilitate group lending or insurance at lower cost. On the technology front, **blockchain** and smart contracts have been proposed for gig work: envision a decentralised platform where payment terms (and partial benefit contributions) are encoded in a smart contract, automatically enforcing minimum pay per task and allocating a fraction to a retirement account. While still speculative, such models are being explored in fintech labs.

Importantly, **data-driven tools** can empower gig workers. Platforms could provide earnings and expense statements through apps, helping workers to budget and apply for credit. Indeed, India's "India Stack" (Aadhaar-based IDs, UPI payments, digital lockers) offers the potential for gig workers to build official financial identities. One CGAP report suggests that India's open data infrastructure is a promising environment for gig-focused financial inclusion. For example, a standardized platform worker ID linked to UPI could allow a financier to verify income and offer loans with confidence.

Beyond technology, **social innovations** also play a role. Civil-society groups and NGOs are developing training programs to improve gig workers' financial literacy. Mobile apps are being created to help workers compare vehicle loan rates or find insurance. Government-civil society partnerships (as recommended by NITI Aayog) could involve NGOs in outreach to workers on schemes and rights. Moreover, some

propose “gig worker brokers” – organizations that help gig workers organize purchasing of benefits (like a union-like role) to get bulk discounts on insurance or training.

To sum up, fintech and related innovations offer tools to mitigate the financial risks of gig work: by smoothing cash flow, enabling access to credit, and promoting savings. Early evidence from pilots is encouraging, but these technologies alone cannot fully replace systemic protections. They should complement – not substitute – broader policy efforts. As a World Bank expert notes, “digital platforms can help increase the visibility of informal workers, supporting efforts to expand social protection coverage for all”. In practice, this means using technology to link gig workers into safety nets, rather than assuming tech fixes will obviate policy measures.

The Future of Financial Security in the Gig Economy

Looking forward, the key challenge is **balancing flexibility with security**. The gig economy is unlikely to reverse: global factors (digital infrastructure, changing preferences, entrepreneurial endeavors) continue to drive platform growth. India’s gig workforce could exceed 20 million by 2030. Ensuring these workers do not fall into deep poverty during downturns or old age will require concerted action across sectors.

Firstly, **social protection must expand**. This likely means multi-tiered solutions. For example, one approach is a **portable social security** framework, where contributions by platforms (and perhaps the government) go into a fund that follows the worker. This fund could finance health insurance, a pension, or maternity benefits for gig workers, even as they switch jobs. India’s existing infrastructure (e.g. the E-Shram and Jan Dhan accounts) could form the backbone of such a scheme. Another approach is universal entitlements: since identifying and taxing many small platforms is hard, the government could finance basic benefits out of tax revenues for all poor and near-poor adults. Such ideas resemble a universal basic income or universal pension schemes, though India has not yet adopted UBI.

Secondly, **income standards** can be set. Some advocate for minimum fare guarantees (minimum wage equivalents) in gig jobs. For instance, if a delivery platform commits to ensuring every driver earns at least X per hour (with the platform covering shortfall), that would cushion the lowest earners. This is akin to a “minimum income subsidy” the government or platform could provide per gig hour. It would require monitoring or regulation to enforce. In the future, algorithms might be regulated to ensure pay transparency and fairness (as the EU is starting to do).

Thirdly, **financial inclusion should deepen**. All gig workers should have a formal bank account and credit history. This can be aided by mandating that platforms facilitate payment of earnings into bank accounts (rather than cash payments). Platforms might also be required to track and share workers’ earnings data (with consent) to credit bureaus. If gig workers can demonstrate consistent earnings even

on multiple apps, they can access loans for housing or education. This would help lift the *overall* standard of living beyond day-to-day survival.

Moreover, we must address **inequality within the gig economy**. The data show women and migrants face extra hurdles. For example, women in platform driving earn less due to being less able to work surge hours. Tailored interventions (like childcare support or targeted skill programs for women) could help close these gaps. Similarly, awareness campaigns might bring more youth or rural workers into higher-paying digital gigs (like freelancing in tech or design).

Finally, **multi-stakeholder governance** is vital. Platforms should not be left to self-regulate entirely. Governments could establish advisory councils including platform firms, gig worker representatives, and experts to oversee the gig sector. Labour unions and cooperatives should be empowered to negotiate as collective bodies. Financial institutions should co-design products for this segment. The 2025 policy brief by NITI Aayog calls for collaborative bodies (e.g. a National Social Security Board) to guide gig worker welfare. Emulating that, effective oversight bodies with gig worker participation can ensure policies reflect ground realities.

In conclusion, safeguarding gig workers' financial security will require layering new protections onto a fluid form of work. A mix of **policy reforms (social security extension, regulations)**, **economic measures (minimum pay norms, microinsurance)**, and **technological tools (fintech services, data platforms)** will be needed. As one commentator notes, "the benefits of technological advancements [must] be equitably distributed among the workforce". India's efforts – from registering gig workers to leveraging its digital ecosystem – show promise, but effective implementation and continuous monitoring are critical. Only by treating gig workers as an integral part of the economy, deserving of basic protections and opportunities to save and invest in their futures, can we ensure their work truly contributes to broad-based prosperity.

Conclusion

The gig economy presents a paradox of flexibility versus insecurity. For many, it offers a lifeline of income and autonomy; for others, it imposes unpredictable earnings and no safety net. In India and globally, gig workers typically earn modest incomes, often without savings or insurance, and face risk of poverty from health or economic shocks. This chapter has detailed the financial challenges of gig work – from income volatility and lack of employer benefits to credit exclusion and savings gaps – and compared these to more secure, traditional employment. We have shown that current labor codes and welfare systems are not yet fully adapted to include the millions of nonstandard workers entering the platform economy.

However, we have also highlighted emerging solutions. Policymakers in India are beginning to respond: by legally recognizing gig workers (Social Security Code),

extending health coverage (PM-JAY expansion), and considering innovative financing recommendations. Private platforms and fintech firms are experimenting with portable benefits accounts and on-demand pay. Case studies from other countries – portable benefits in the U.S., collective bargaining successes, EU directives – provide models for how to combine flexibility with fairness.

Our analysis underscores that ensuring financial security for gig workers demands a **multi-faceted approach**. Governments must enforce adaptable social security systems (possibly through universal or portable schemes), regulate fair labor practices on digital platforms, and facilitate financial inclusion. Platform companies should contribute to welfare funds and enable transparent earnings mechanisms. Financial institutions and fintechs must tailor services (credit, insurance, savings) to the gig context. And crucially, gig workers themselves – including women, youth, and migrants – need to be organized and empowered to voice their needs.

The gig economy is here to stay, but it need not condemn its workforce to perpetual precarity. With coordinated efforts, gig work can be restructured to combine its modern flexibility with protections that ensure gig workers' incomes can weather crises and sustain their future. As India charts its path – building on both policy initiatives and innovations – the goal must be a truly **inclusive gig economy**: one where gig workers can earn a livelihood with dignity, access the same social securities as others, and plan for the long term. The transformation of the labor market is an opportunity as well as a challenge; addressing the financial security of gig workers is a critical step toward equitable growth in the digital age.

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